The US could still try to play the ethnic card in Iran

But past experience and current geopolitical realities show such a strategy is doomed to failure.Associate Professor of Middle East History at California State University San Marcos.Published On 6 Apr 2026Fighters from the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), an Iranian Kurdish opposition group, near the border with Iran in Iraq's Kurdistan Region, on the outskirts of Sulaimaniya, Iraq, June 21, 2025 [Ako Rasheed/Reuters]As the US threatens to launch a ground invasion of Iran, many questions remain about its goals and geographical span. Some scenarios suggest a focus on some of the islands in the Gulf, others – joining forces with local insurgent groups.Early on in the war, Washington seemed to toy with the idea of supporting opposition groups from Iran’s large Kurdish minority to launch a war by proxy.According to reports in the Israeli media, initial efforts by Mossad to encourage attacks by Kurdish groups in Iran’s northwest failed due to “leaks, distrust”. Iran bolstered its defences in the area and put pressure on the authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Iranian Kurdish groups are based.Last week, in an interview with Fox News, US President Donald Trump acknowledged that the US provided weapons to the Kurds.Further action involving either Kurdish or other ethnic opposition groups may still be on the table as his administration seeks to put together an exit strategy from the war. Encouraging local insurgencies to weaken Tehran may seem like a good plan, but would it work?Iran’s weak spotsFomenting ethnic or religious tensions in the enemy camp is an old military tactic, which the US itself has used many times in the Middle East. Trump is likely looking for ways to gain leverage over the regime in Tehran and stretch its military capabilities. Iran’s internal fractures may seem to offer some opportunities for that.In the past three decades, Tehran has failed to address the growing grievances of various minority populations in the country’s periphery. Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Balochis feel marginalised in the Shi’a majority state, while Arab and Kurdish Shia Muslims feel discriminated against by ethnic Persians.This has led to various anti-government mobilisations, including armed ones over the past three decades.Kurdish armed groups based in Iraq have operated for decades in northwestern Iran. Kurdish areas have also seen waves of mass protests, the most recent of which was in the autumn of 2022 following the death of a Kurdish woman at the hands of morality police in Tehran.Other armed groups have also been active. In 2018, an attack on a military parade in the city of Ahvaz killed 29 people; an Arab separatist group claimed responsibility. In 2019, Baluchi rebels of the Jaish Al Adl group attacked a bus carrying members of the IRGC, killing at least 27. A raid by the same group on a police station in 2023 killed 11 security personnel. Then in 2024, the bombing of a mourner’s procession for the late General Qasem Sulaimani killed at least 90 people in the southeastern city of Kerman; ISIL claimed responsibility.All of these incidents expose weaknesses in Iran’s periphery, which its enemies have long tried to exploit. If Trump decides to go down that path, he should take heed of the experiences of those who have tried to undermine the authorities in Tehran by fomenting ethno-religious insurgencies.Past failuresIraq’s president Saddam Hussein was one of them. When he decided to invade Iran in 1980, he saw an opportunity in the ethnic unrest among Kurds and Arabs the Islamic Republic had inherited from the monarchical regime. Saddam Hussein encouraged insurgencies among both minorities.By the time Iraqi troops stormed onto Iranian territory, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) had already launched a rebellion against the newly formed Islamic Republic in 1979. Iraq eventually provided arms and finances, enabling the KDP-I to take over some territory and hold it for months, but internal fighting and the brutal campaign Tehran launched through its Revolutionary Guards managed to suppress the rebellion by 1982-83.Saddam also tried to get the Arabs in the south to revolt, some Iranian Arab separatist groups fought alongside Iraqi forces in the battle for the Iranian city of Khorramshahr in 1980. But the Sunni Arab community did not join in large numbers. Shi’a Arabs had no desire to participate in what they saw as a foreign invasion, launched by an Sunni-dominated Iraqi regime. As a result, Saddam never got the mass Arab uprising he wished for.Twenty years later, US President George W Bush tried to use a similar playbook against Iran. He authorised the CIA and other intelligence outfits to carry out covert operations in Iran and funnel money and equipment to some opposition armed groups.Like Saddam, Bush also failed to foment rebellions in Iran. This is not just because the Islamic Republic was able to handle security situations swifty and decisively, but also because efforts to incite uprisings never really got enough momentum. The reason for that is that parts of Iran’s minorities are well-integrated into the nation’s core and elite. Ethno-religious identities and socio-economic realities in Iran are too complex to feed into a simple black-and-white narrative about ethnic oppression by the Persian majority.The likelihood of success todayMore than a month into the war on Iran, it is by now clear that US and Israeli efforts to trigger a mass uprising in Iran by decapitating the regime have failed.At this time, there is nothing to suggest that any efforts to foment ethnic insurgencies would be more successful. US-Israel support for separatist groups is unlikely to get anywhere further than localised acts of sabotage or small skirmishes.This would not divert important military resources and attention away from the fight with the US and Israel, as Iran is fighting a techno-guerilla war, where its most valuable weapons are missiles and drones – not ground troops.Furthermore, there is significant regional opposition to US support for separatist groups from major allies, including Pakistan and Turkiye. Islamabad has been dealing its own violent attacks carried out by Baluch separatists in the southwest of the country. Meanwhile, for Ankara, the issue of any support for Kurdish groups is highly sensitive given its own long history of unrest in the Kurdish regions of the country.Iraq would also be reluctant to support such activities. The government in Baghdad, as well as the Kurdistan Regional Government, would not risk retaliation from Iran by allowing US-Israeli support for the Iranian Kurds to take place on Iraqi territory.Inciting ethnic insurgencies may seem like a good strategy on paper, but in reality it would be another recipe for disaster for the Trump administration, which is already struggling with enough failures in its war on Iran.The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.